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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [IAEA](#) [MNUC](#) [IR](#) [SY](#) [TRGY](#) [PREL](#)
SUBJECT: U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN
AND SYRIA

CLASSIFIED BY: ISN ACTING A/S VAN DIEPEN, REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D)

¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAGRAPHS 6-8.

SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) DIRECTOR GENERAL (DG) ELBARADEI RELEASED HIS LATEST REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATIONS INTO IRAN AND SYRIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ON AUGUST 28, 2009. THE IRAN REPORT CONTAINS TWO INSTANCES OF PARTIAL COOPERATION ON MEASURES IN ARAK AND NATANZ THAT IRAN ALREADY IS OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE BUT THAT IT HAD PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO AGREE TO OR IMPLEMENT. THIS LIMITED ?COOPERATION? IS LONG OVERDUE, BUT IT DOES NOT ADDRESS ANY FUNDAMENTAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND IN ANY CASE IS MERELY IRAN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF TWO SMALL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT IT WAS REQUIRED TO FULFILL FROM THE VERY BEGINNING?WHILE LEAVING THE BULK OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNFULFILLED. CONSEQUENTLY, ITS LAST-MINUTE "COOPERATION" SHOULD NOT BE OVERSTATED. HOWEVER, IRAN WILL SEEK TO POINT TO THESE TWO MODEST STEPS AS A DEMONSTRATION OF ITS "TRANSPARENCY" WITH THE IAEA.

13. (SBU) SYRIA MAY ALSO TRY TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE REPORT AS A DEMONSTRATION OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA. THE IAEA CONTINUED ITS INVESTIGATION INTO TRACES OF UNDECLARED URANIUM FOUND AT THE MINIATURE NEUTRON SOURCE REACTOR (MNSR) WITH SUFFICIENT SYRIAN COOPERATION. HOWEVER, THIS LIMITED COOPERATION AT A DECLARED FACILITY CONTRASTS MARKEDLY WITH SYRIA'S CONTINUED REFUSAL ON A MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE TO PROVIDE THE IAEA WITH ANY FURTHER ACCESS TO ADDITIONAL SITES IN SYRIA OR INFORMATION TO CORROBORATE ITS EXPLANATION AS TO WHY URANIUM WAS FOUND AT THE AL KIBAR REACTOR SITE. INSTEAD, SYRIA HAS REJECTED THE IAEA'S RIGHT TO SUCH ACCESS AND DISMISSED ITS OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ENGAGE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS TO DISCUSS THE REPORTS AND THEIR PLANNED INTERVENTION ON BOTH IRAN AND SYRIA AT THE 7-11 SEPTEMBER IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING. POSTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE STATEMENTS THAT CALL ON IRAN AND SYRIA TO COOPERATE FULLY, TRANSPARENTLY, AND WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY WITH THE IAEA. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND

14. (SBU) THE LATEST REPORT ON IRAN'S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS UNSC AND IAEA OBLIGATIONS DEMONSTRATES IRAN'S CONTINUED FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL AND SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT THE IAEA HAS WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE KEY FINDINGS FROM THE REPORT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- IRAN HAS REFUSED TO SUSPEND ITS PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AS REQUIRED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IRAN HAS ALSO REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.

-- IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO ANSWER THE IAEA'S QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS PAST WEAPONIZATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES. THE REPORT OFFERED AN EXPANDED RECITATION OF THESE ISSUES THAT UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR IRAN TO COOPERATE. IRAN REFUSES TO PROVIDE ADDITION INFORMATION, INSISTING THAT IT HAS ALREADY PROVIDED ITS FINAL REPOSENSE TO THE IAEA'S QUESTION (NAMELY, ITS CLAIM THAT THE MATERIALS INVOLVED ARE "BASELESS FABRICATIONS," A CHARGE THAT THE IAEA VEHEMENTLY DENIES). AS THIS AND PREVIOUS REPORTS MAKE CLEAR, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM IRAN IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE INVESTIGATION OF IRAN'S WEAPONIZATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES. IRAN MUST FULLY COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA AND COMPLY WITH IAEA REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, CLARIFICATION, OR ACCESS, INCLUDING ON THIS SUBJECT.

-- WHILE THE NUMBER OF CENTRIFUGES ENRICHING URANIUM HAS DROPPED SLIGHTLY, THE IAEA HAS CONFIRMED THAT IRAN NOW POSSESSES MORE THAN 1,400 KILOGRAMS OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (LEUF6). IRAN CLAIMS IT HAS PRODUCED MORE THAN 1,500 KGS OF LEUF6 BUT THIS CANNOT BE VERIFIED UNTIL NOVEMBER, WHEN THE IAEA IS SCHEDULE TO UNDERTAKE ITS PHYSICAL INVENTORY VERIFICATION. UNDER EITHER CASE, THAT WOULD BE ENOUGH STOCKPILED LEUF6 FOR ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON IF ENRICHED TO WEAPONS-USEABLE LEVELS.

-- IRAN REMAINS THE ONLY STATE WITH SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES THAT IS NOT IMPLEMENTING THE REVISED CODE 3.1 OF THE SUDSIDIARY ARRANGEMENT TO ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (TO WHICH IT HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED BUT LATER REJECTED AND REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT), WHICH REQUIRES THE EARLY PROVISION OF DESIGN INFORMATION FOR NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES. ABSENT IRANIAN ADHERENCE TO THE MODIFIED CODE 3.1, IRAN COULD BUILD A NEW NUCLEAR FACILITY AND CLAIM THAT IT WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO DECLARE IT UNTIL AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW MATERIAL. THE IAEA (AND THE UNITED STATES) HAVE REJECTED THIS INTERPRETATION.

-- IRAN ACCEPTED AN AUGMENTED IAEA SAFEGUARDS APPROACH AT THE NATANZ FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT AND PERMITTED A DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION INSPECTION AT THE ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR IN MID-AUGUST. ALTHOUGH BOTH ARE POSITIVE STEPS, IRAN HAD LITTLE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THESE ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS AT NATANZ, WHICH WERE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE BARE MINIMUM IAEA MONITORING OF A FACILITY THAT CONTINUES TO EXPAND.

-- AS FOR THE ARAK REACTOR, IRAN PERMITTED THIS ACCESS ONCE BUT MAINTAINS ITS STANCE ON CODE 3.1, MEANING THAT IT WILL NOT PROVIDE CONTINUING ACCESS THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY FREQUENT TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. FURTHER, ALTHOUGH A VISIT WAS PERMITTED, THE IAEA IS STILL WAITING ON IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING THE DESIGN OF THE REACTOR AND ITS SUB-SYSTEMS.

15. (SBU) DG ELBARADEI?' REPORT ON SYRIA REINFORCES OUR CONCLUSION THAT SYRIA WAS ENGAGED IN A CLANDESTINE EFFORT TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE A NUCLEAR REACTOR AT AL KIBAR. IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS THE LITANY OF FRUITLESS ATTEMPTS BY THE IAEA TO SOLICIT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND CLARIFICATIONS FROM SYRIA. SPECIFICALLY:

-- THE REPORT NOTES THAT SYRIA CONTINUES TO DENY AGENCY INSPECTORS ACCESS TO INFORMATION, LOCATIONS, EQUIPMENT, AND MATERIAL NEEDED FOR IT TO CONCLUDE ITS INVESTIGATION.

-- WITH REGARD TO SUSPICIOUS PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES, THE REPORT NOTES THAT SYRIA HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE SYRIA'S CLAIM THAT THE SUSPICIOUS EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WERE INTENDED FOR NON-NUCLEAR PURPOSES.

-- IMPORTANTLY, THE REPORT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, CLEARLY DEBUNKS SYRIA'S ASSERTION THAT IT IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON AL KIBAR OR THE OTHER SUSPECTED SITES BECAUSE OF THEIR MILITARY NATURE. THE REPORT STATES, "THERE IS NO LIMITATION IN COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS ON AGENCY ACCESS TO INFORMATION, ACTIVITIES OR LOCATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY MAY BE MILITARY RELATED." THE REPORT ADDS, "THE FACT THAT THE AGENCY HAS FOUND PARTICLES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF A TYPE WHICH IS NOT IN THE DECLARED INVENTORY OF SYRIA UNDERSCORES THE NEED TO PURSUE THIS MATTER."

-- THE IAEA ALSO CONTINUED ITS SEPARATE INVESTIGATION INTO TRACES OF UNDECLARED URANIUM FOUND AT THE MNSR. THE RESULTS OF THE ASSOCIATED ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING CAMPAIGN HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED. HOWEVER, SYRIA'S COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA ON THE UNDECLARED MATERIAL DETECTED AT THE MNSR SHOULD NOT BE MISCONSTRUED IN ANY WAY AS SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH THE SEPARATE IAEA INVESTIGATION INTO SYRIA'S CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE AL KIBAR REACTOR, WHICH IS STILL SEVERELY LACKING.

ACTION REQUESTS

16. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR BERLIN, LONDON, AND PARIS: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM ALL HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DELIVERING THIS DEMARCHE TO ALL BOARD MEMBERS USING THE BACKGROUND IN PARAGRAPHS 4-5. POSTS SHOULD INQUIRE AS TO THE NATURE OF THE EU STATEMENTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA AND STRESS THAT THE EU STATEMENTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THESE KEY ISSUES AS WELL.

17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL OTHER POSTS: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO CONVEY U.S. VIEWS REGARDING THE IAEA REPORTS TO APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND RELEVANT PERMANENT MISSIONS IN VIENNA. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THE BACKGROUND PARAGRAPHS 4-5 IN DELIVERING U.S. VIEWS AND MAY LEAVE BACKGROUND POINTS AS A NON-PAPER. WITH REGARD TO IRAN, POSTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IRAN'S

LAST-MINUTE COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA IN PROVIDING FOR MINIMAL SAFEGUARDS AND ACCESS AT NATANZ AND ARAK RESPECTIVELY DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE IAEA'S SERIOUS CONCERNS WITH IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, OR IRAN'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA, POSTS SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT SYRIA'S REFUSAL TO ENGAGE WITH THE IAEA HAS STALLED THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATION FOR OVER A YEAR. NO CONFIDENCE AS TO THE ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN EITHER COUNTRY CAN EXIST ABSENT THEIR FULL, TRANSPARENT, AND IMMEDIATE COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA.

18. (SBU) FURTHER ACTION REQUEST: POSTS ARE ALSO ASKED TO ENCOURAGE HOST COUNTRIES TO GIVE STRONG STATEMENTS AT THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE IAEA AND ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND CALLING ON IRAN AND SYRIA TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE IAEA AND TO IMPLEMENT THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL. IN ADDITION, POSTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE STRONG STATEMENTS FROM REGIONAL OR OTHER GROUPS, E.G., EUROPEAN UNION, THE GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, THE GROUP OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, THE AFRICA GROUP, ETC. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, POSTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO INSTRUCT THEIR DELEGATIONS NOT TO ACCEPT STATEMENTS FROM ANY GROUP TO WHICH THEY ARE A MEMBER THAT WOULD DOWNPLAY THE FACTUAL REPORTS OF THE IAEA, OR UNDERCUT THE AGENCY'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY INFORMATION AND ACCESS NEEDED TO RESOLVE THESE SERIOUS ISSUES.

19. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE: IN ADDITION TO CONVEYING THESE MESSAGES TO LOCAL IAEA MISSIONS, UNVIE SHOULD CONTINUE PROMOTING SUPPORT WITHIN THE IAEA SECRETARIAT AND AMONG IAEA BOARD MEMBERS FOR CONTINUING AND EXPANDING THE INVESTIGATION INTO BOTH IRAN AND SYRIA'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND PRESSURING BOTH TO COOPERATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO PLACE MAXIMUM EFFORT INTO SECURING STRONG NATIONAL STATEMENTS DEMANDING IRANIAN AND SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA BY AS MANY BOARD MEMBERS AS POSSIBLE. MISSION SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT WE CONTINUE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A P5+1 JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING IRAN, BUT WOULD NEGOTIATE ANY SUCH STATEMENT DIRECTLY AMONG CAPITALS.

110. (SBU) POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT ANY SUBSTANTIVE REACTIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. MICHAEL BEDKE (ISN/RA, 202-736-4686) AND JODY DANIEL (ISN/RA, 202-647-9486) ARE THE POCS FOR THIS ISSUE.
CLINTON